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Abstract
We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in
expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive branch. Using
municipal data, we identify cycles independently for the two branches, evaluate
the effects of overlaps, and account for general year effects. We find sizable
effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before
joint elections. In the case of overlapping elections, we show that it is important
whether the executive incumbent seeks re-election. To account for the potential
endogeneity of that decision, we apply an IV approach based on age and pension
eligibility rules.
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Originating with Nordhaus (1975), a main paradigm of the political economics literature
is that political agents act rationally when deliberately manipulating the economy or par-
ticular fiscal aggregates to gain an electoral advantage. Further theory (e.g., Rogoff and
Sibert, 1988 and Rogoff, 1990) confirms the main prediction of that paradigm, even un-
der rational expectations of voters.1 While the early empirical literature looks for cycles
in macroeconomic aggregates, such as unemployment and inflation2, newer work highlights
credible evidence for political budget cycles (henceforth, PBCs) in fiscal aggregates, such as
debt, public expenditures and their composition (see Keech and Pak, 1989, Alesina et al.,
1997, and Brender and Drazen, 2005).3 Overall, the PBC phenomenon is relatively well
understood and the empirical evidence highlights its relevance in actual policy making (see
Philips, 2016 and Dubois, 2016).
This paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we explore PBCs in overall
public expenditures for regional elections in the legislative and the executive branch.4 We
study the cycles of the two institutions independently, evaluate the effects of randomly oc-
curring electoral overlaps, and separate the effects from general year effects. This contrasts
with the existing literature, which focuses either on the legislative branch or on joint elec-
tions.5 Second, for the analysis of PBCs in the executive, we highlight the concerns related
to the endogenous decision of incumbent executives to seek re-election. Overcoming that
endogeneity is crucial, as we only expect PBCs when the incumbent competes for re-election.
To that end, we use an instrumental variables approach based on the age of the incumbent
as well as on public pension eligibility rules to achieve credible identification.
The testing ground for our analysis is at the German sub-national level. We focus on
municipalities in the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg because those two states
share a comparable institutional design (in contrast to some other German states), and
exploiting their particular features allow us causally to identify PBCs for the legislative and
the executive branches, the effects of overlapping elections, all while accounting for year
effects. For the 1992-2006 period, we observe all key variables on expenditures, transfers,
1 Alternatively, Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Shi and Svensson (2006) provide a theoretical foundation
for political budget cycles under rational expectations and moral hazard. A second strand of theoretical
work relates to partisan cycles (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987, 1988a) that explain electoral cycles by
shifts in political ideology.
2 Studies finding only weak or no evidence for cycles in real macroeconomic aggregates include, among
others, Lächler (1978), Golden and Poterba (1980) and Alesina et al. (1997).
3 Further evidence at the national level is provided by Alesina (1988b), Alesina et al. (1992), Schuknecht
(1999), Potrafke (2012), and Klomp and De Haan (2013).
4 While some papers study the composition of spending and distinguish between different types of spending
categories that are more or less observable (see, e.g., Khemani (2004); Drazen and Eslava (2010)), we
take the route of most of the literature and study total expenditures.
5 The unique setting of our design is acknowledged in Alesina and Passalacqua (2016) in the Handbook of
Macroeconomics.
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elections to the legislative and the executive branch, as well as important socio-economic
characteristics (population, age structure, ideological indicators for councils and mayors).6
Our paper is related to a broader literature focusing on PBCs in (local or regional) ex-
penditures. In Table A.1 in the appendix, we provide a detailed and exhaustive overview
of papers studying such cycles at the sub-national level. In total, we document 30 studies
with evidence from 16 countries.7 Most research focuses on legislative elections and uses
variation over time to separate election effects from general year effects.8
Apart from the papers in Table A.1, we identify four additional relevant studies. Using
alternative outcome variables and focusing on local elections in Germany, Foremny and
Riedel (2014) (taxes) and Englmaier and Stowasser (2013) (savings bank lending) provide
evidence that PBCs are important.9 In addition, Furdas et al. (2015) present a closely related
analysis in which interactions of PBCs in expenditures across different German governmental
tiers (local legislative elections and corresponding state elections) are the focus of attention.10
The work by Hessami (2018) highlights the differences stemming from a further dimension
of election laws. Only mayors that are elected directly by the voters (and not appointed
by the council) are shown to have an incentive to attract more state investment grants in
election years.
For elections to the executive branch, only a limited number of papers investigate PBCs
(e.g., Rose, 2006; Alt and Rose, 2009; Garmann, 2017b). One reason is that the executive
frequently is not elected directly by the voters (Hessami (2018) being a notable exception).
In addition, even if separate elections are held, the timing of those elections often coincide.
The papers by Rosenberg (1992) for Israel and Aidt et al. (2011) for Portugal both study
cases in which legislative and executive branch elections are held simultaneously. In both
studies, the authors control directly for whether the incumbent executive seeks re-election,
6 While a longer time series would always be desirable, we are bound by data availability in BW before
1992 and the introduction of new accounting standards in BAY after 2006.
7 More broadly, our paper generally contributes to the understanding of political economy at the regional
level (see, e.g., Kessing (2010); Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2013); Baskaran (2012); Freier and
Odendahl (2015); Garmann (2015)).
8 Note that the literature is divided into those studying the size of aggregate expenditures close to elections
(similar to our question) and those testing for PBCs in the composition of expenditures. Evidence
for the latter is first presented by Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Kneebone and Mckenzie (2001) for
Canada and subsequently by Drazen and Eslava (2010), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya (2004) in the case of municipal or regional legislative elections in Colombia, Portugal, and
Russia, respectively. Common to all their results is a shift in expenditures, especially to categories with
high visibility for the electorate.
9 Earlier studies for Germany include Seitz (2000), Galli and Rossi (2002), Schneider (2010) as well as
Mechtel and Potrafke (2013), which test for PBCs in total expenditures, budget deficits and unemploy-
ment using state-level data.
10 In section 5, we highlight that we can control for the timing of state-level elections. However, as we have
just two states, we cannot make the same analytical progress (carefully studying the interaction of those
cycles) as skillfully achieved by Furdas et al. (2015). On the other hand, our focus on executive and
legislative cycles can be studied uniquely in the present design, as institutional circumstances and data
availability prevent us from using other German states.
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but cannot treat the endogeneity of that decision. Our contribution is that we tackle such
endogeneity using a novel instrumental variables approach.
Crucial for the validity of our empirical analysis is the fact that local election dates are
regulated by state law and are, therefore, set exogenously with very little or virtually no
influence on the timing in individual municipalities. The legislative elections throughout our
sample are held on state-specific dates. In contrast, regulations with respect to executive
elections differ between states, i.e., election dates for the executive branch sometimes align
with council elections and sometimes held on municipal-specific dates that differ from the
dates of legislative elections (see Section 5). Given this differing structure of election timing,
we can identify PBCs in both legislative and executive branch elections plus separate those
effects from general year effects.
Our main results are threefold. First, we identify sizable and significant increases in total
expenditures in pre-election years for the legislative branch. These results are in the range
of 1.3–1.8 percent of total expenditures and remain stable throughout all of our robustness
tests. For a medium-sized town of 5,000 inhabitants, this amounts to additional spending
in the order of about 170,000 Euro in the year prior to the election. Second, we find
that the cycles induced by legislative elections are unaffected by the timing of executive
branch elections. Third, we show a significant effect of overlapping cycles conditional on
the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election. Aggregate expenditures increase in joint pre-
election and election years if the incumbent executive seeks re-election and decline in joint
post-election years if she did not. For instance, given that the incumbent reenters the race
for office, local spending in overlapping pre-election years is 5.5 percent larger than in the
counterfactual situation when the incumbent does not seek re-election. However, our results
come with one caveat: The complex structure of our estimations with several interaction
terms saturates the model such that, given the number of observations, some results are
only marginally significant.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional setting while
Section 3 derives hypotheses. Section 4 presents our data and descriptive statistics. In
Section 5 we lay out the identification strategy, Section 6 discusses the main results and
Section 7 presents the sensitivity analyses. Section 8 concludes.
2. Institutional background
The institutional arrangements of Baden-Württemberg (BW) and Bavaria (BAY) equip us
with the exact features we need in order to test the hypothesis of overlapping PBCs.11
Municipalities are governed by an elected council and a directly elected mayor. Councils act
11 The municipal level in Germany is the lowest of four governmental tiers. In addition to the federal level,
Germany comprises 16 federal states, about 450 counties, and about 12,000 municipalities.
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as the legislative body and mayors represent the executive branch.12 While the legislative
members are elected based on open list proportional elections, majoritarian elections are
held to determine the race for the executive branch.13 In BAY, the legislative and executive
branch are elected for six years on (generally) the same statewide election day.14 In contrast,
election terms in BW are of different length and election days vary accordingly: the local
head of the executive branch is elected for eight years, while legislative elections are held
every five years. Furthermore, only legislative elections are held on the same statewide day.
The election dates for the executive branch are municipal-specific, i.e., each municipality
has its own electoral cycle for such elections.
We illustrate the distribution over time of both types of elections in our estimation sample
in Figure 1.15 Within the time horizon of this study, we observe legislative elections held in
1996 and 2002 in BAY and in 1994, 1999, and 2004 in case of BW. Executive elections in
BW spread evenly throughout the years and only randomly overlap with legislative elections
(14.7% of the cases). In BAY, both elections generally run parallel. As an exception to the
general rule, 10.7% of the executive election cycles in our estimation sample deviate (as some
past election cycles ended prematurely). We examined the deviating towns carefully and
find them to be significantly larger in size and to differ in their demographic compositions.
To make sure that our results are not driven by the few deviating observations in BAY, we
also repeat the analysis dropping those non-standard observations. Reassuringly, the results
remain comparable to our main findings.
Crucial for the validity of our empirical analysis is the fact that the timing of local elections
(legislative as well as executive) is regulated by state law and is, for the most part, beyond
the control of individual municipalities. The timing of the legislative elections is fixed
entirely by given state wide election terms and therefore is exogenous.16 While in principle
12 Note that the mayor is also a voting member of the council. Generally, the mayor is in charge of the
administration, preparing all municipal decisions and overseeing their implementation. Also, she often
is the town’s only full-time working politician.
13 The electoral rules in both states are quite similar. There are, however, also subtle differences. For
legislative elections, both states have open-list proportional elections where voters have as many votes
as there are seats in the council (which allows for vote-splitting and cross-voting). There are no explicit
hurdles for small parties. While BW uses a Sainte-Lague seat allocation mechanism, BAY uses a two-step
D’Hondt approach. For executive elections, both states use a two-round majoritarian procedure. If no
candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, a second election must be held. In BAY, this
second election is a classical run-off election between the two leading candidates. In BW, the second
election is open (even new candidates are allowed) and first-past-the-post.
14 Exceptions to this rule arise when mayoral terms end prematurely. In that case, a Bavarian municipality
might hold an independent executive election for one term, with the requirement to align with the state
wide election dates again in the subsequent election.
15 The number of elections in BW increases slightly over time as it becomes easier to obtain all necessary
information in later years.
16 No option for premature elections exists for the legislative branch. As no formal coalition agreements
are negotiated at the local level, a municipal government cannot break down. If a council member dies
in office or resigns for personal reasons, she is replaced automatically with a successor. These successors
are determined during the election and consist of candidates which exhibited sufficient votes but have
not been allocated seats in the local council due to the D’Hondt allocation mechanism.
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the same also is true for executive elections, the mayor’s term may potentially deviate from
the general rule. In particular, the mayor’s term may end prematurely for a number of
reasons. First, the citizens or the council may recall the mayor.17 Second, the mayor may
die or resign for personal (e.g., sickness) or political (e.g., lack of political support) reasons.
A third reason causing deviations from the predefined length of political terms is given by
the existence of strict age limits preventing incumbents from serving beyond the age of 68
in BW.18
With respect to expenditures, local governments play important roles in the provision
of public services. Municipalities in both states are responsible for roughly 50% of all
public spending in the state (see Federal Statistical Office, 2011).19 Among other things,
municipalities are in charge of general administration, public order, cultural expenditures,
infrastructure, and public transport. In addition, towns often oversee local public firms and
administer expenditures from higher-level governmental tiers (e.g., expenditures on social
welfare). Despite the often complex division of tasks between the different governmental
tiers, municipalities retain considerable discretion in spending decisions.
Focusing on BAY and BW in a sub-national study of PBCs is attractive for several reasons.
First, historically, both states have had direct executive elections since the end of World War
II. That contrasts with all other German states, which introduced direct elections to the
executive branch only in the mid-1990s (see Ade and Freier, 2013; Garmann, 2015; Hessami,
2018). Consequently, we cannot study individual PBCs in executive and legislative elections
in other states earlier than the 2000s.20 Furthermore, since the mayor is automatically a
17 While recall is a constitutionally guaranteed right of the citizens and the council, we almost never observe
such an event during the period covered in this study.
18 We further discuss the importance of premature executive elections in our section on identification (see
Section 5).
19 Municipalities in BW are responsible for 52.9% of all state expenditures, which exceeds the German
average (including municipal budgets as well as public companies under the control of local towns).
Municipalities in BAY administer 49.7% of total state spending.
20 And even then, evidence from those other German states would be particular as their direct executive
elections were introduced very recently.
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voting member of the council in both states, studying the overlap of individual cycles is
particularly interesting, as the institutional setting may leave room for collusion between
the elected branches of government.
Second, the constitutional framework that governs the affairs of the local level follows
a comparable standard in BAY and BW. Both states operate in a constitutional setting
that is referred to as Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung. Important for our study, that particular
constitutional setting grants extensive rights and duties to the head of the executive branch,
again standing partly in contrast to the institutional structures of other German states, in
particular with respect to expenditures.
Third, the two states in our analysis are comparable along many other dimensions. Both
are located in the south of Germany. In addition, both states have had conservative state
rule throughout the time covered in this study.21 The two states are of comparable size
and population.22 Finally, BAY and BW are of comparable wealth and industrial perfor-
mance.23 In both states, the municipalities are well off financially, the level of public debt
is comparatively low, and the towns enjoy extensive financial liberties.24
3. Theoretical considerations
In order to derive testable hypotheses, it is necessary to take a more detailed look at the
precise relation between the legislative and the executive branches as well as the distribution
of powers and duties. In addition to being a voting member and head of the legislative body,
the executive also serves as the principal agenda setter. She initially has the sole right to
cancel or put topics on the political agenda and is free to rearrange the order of voting on
those topics during legislative meetings.
Based on an informal application, which must be supported by a minimum of one-fourth
of the regular members of the legislative body, however, the executive branch may lose
the exclusive right to be the agenda setter. In such a case, the members of the legislative
also gain the right to put topics for consideration on the agenda. The potential range of
these topics is only mildly restricted and may not involve topics that are explicitly assigned
by law to the executive branch.25 The final agenda always must be made public prior to
21 BAY was governed by absolute majorities of the Conservative Party throughout the period covered by
this study. In BW, the Conservative Party also headed the state’s government; however, it did so as the
predominant member of a coalition.
22 Consequently, the municipal structures are quite similar. While BW has slightly larger municipalities
on average, the differences are rather small compared to other German states. Together, the two states
account for more than 25% of the German population.
23 Together they account for approximately 75% of total state redistribution under the German fiscal
equalization scheme (see Heinemann et al., 2015).
24 Municipalities in other German states might have very limited financial opportunities for extraordinary
investment projects or other general pork barrel spending before elections.
25 The latter, for instance, involves issues regarding public administration.
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the respective legislative meeting. Generally, the legislative branch may take decisions by
absolute majorities. Consequently, the legislative branch may not only put new topics on
the agenda, but also may overrule the executive by voting on them. In order to balance
powers, the executive has the right to veto decisions taken by the legislative branch if they
are deemed to be at the expense of the general welfare of the municipality. Furthermore,
the executive is obligated to cast a veto if the decision is determined to be illegal. But it can
only do so once a decision has been taken and may not prevent topics from being placed on
the agenda in advance. Crucial in this context, the legislative branch may even overrule a
veto by the executive if the latter was expected to affect municipal welfare negatively. That
can be done by putting the respective topic on the agenda once again.
A feature of executive elections at the local level in Germany is that electoral campaigns
and their public perceptions usually focus on the individual candidate rather than the polit-
ical party (which is more important at higher governmental levels). Consequently, if PBCs
are implemented to signal competence, the incumbency status of the executive is likely to
alter the probability of observing political budget cycles induced by the executive.26
One can therefore summarise that the executive branches in BAY and BW generally hold
key positions in the context of municipal fiscal decision making, especially in comparison
to other federal states in Germany. However, the executive branch does not have sole
responsibility for municipal finances. Indeed, relative to the legislative branch, the executive
is in a slightly weaker position.
Apart from the institutional setting, we need to make assumptions about the type of
PBCs we believe are prevalent in order to deduce testable hypotheses. Even though we view
the contribution of this paper to be in the empirical identification of the effects, structuring
the theoretical considerations helps considerably to interpret the results properly.
First, we assume that politicians (mayors or the council members) find it worthwhile
to manipulate fiscal aggregates prior to elections. While that might be because voters are
agnostic (the Nordhaus-type of models) or this represents a mechanism to signal competence
(the Rogoff-type model), past research has documented that generally this type of behaviour
matters and we have no reason to believe otherwise. It is important to note, that while
general PBCs can be explained by both type of models, the mechanism for heterogeneous
effects when the incumbent mayor re-runs for office aligns only with the Rogoff-type models
of competence signaling.
Second, like much of the literature, we presume that voters care for more spending rather
than less. That is to say, voters are not fiscally conservative. Although voters’ motivations
26 One careful referee raised the issue that mayors could in fact have incentives to signal competence even
when not running for office again. If they hope to be elected in a different municipality, they may still
opt to increase spending. Reassuringly, the number of such cases is not large in our dataset. 98% of the
candidates in our sample run for election only in a single municipality. We further want to note, however,
that as those switching candidates are included in the baseline model (coded as not re-running), any
positive spending effect for them would represent a lower-bound and conservative estimate.
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ultimately remain an assumption, we believe that the literature provides us with ample evi-
dence that that is the case for German local elections (more so than for Swiss or US voters).
Most importantly, Asatryan et al. (2017) show that the introduction of direct democracy at
the local level in Germany is associated with more public spending and document that local
German voters do not seem to be fiscally conservative. Freier (2015) shows that mayors
- comprising those of towns included in our sample - achieve a significant increase in the
incumbency advantage when raising spending over and above the median level increase. At
the same time, an upsurge in debt does not significantly alter the re-election chances. Also
the evidence on local German tax increases being shifted to post-election years brought
forward by Foremny and Riedel (2014) is corroborative for the lack of fiscal conservatism
observed in German local elections.
Based on the foregoing assumptions and given the institutional features, we propose the
following three hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.
Hypothesis 1. Both the legislative and the executive branches have the opportunities
and the incentives to engage in strategic spending around municipal
elections with the aim of gaining electoral advantages.
Hypothesis 2. Relative to the executive branch, cycles for the legislative branch
should be more pronounced.
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood of observing political budget cycles in the executive
branch should be strengthened if the incumbent seeks re-election to
office.
Given the institutional framework, overlapping mayoral and council elections represent
special situations and should cause an alteration in the incentives faced by both the legisla-
tive and the executive bodies. Based on the implicit assumption that pre-electoral spending
is perceived by the electorate as a signal of competence, overlapping elections will result in
a setting in which observed signals cannot be associated perfectly with either of the two
political actors. We assume that the electorate is likely to reward both branches, which in-
creases the incentives for collusion between both political spheres.27 Compared to situations
in which election dates diverge, the executive may now free-ride on the legislative election as
the incentives for the legislative branch to support rather than overrule projects initiated by
27 We would argue that it is indeed very likely that both branches can claim (at least partial) credit. That is
particularly the case because local mayors and local council members face much higher degrees of direct
political exposure to one another than they do at higher levels of government. We therefore assume
that mayors and councils can solve any emerging free-rider problems or credit-claiming issues. If voters
attribute spending to a particular politician and reward her accordingly, the resulting incentives could
well produce the opposite results in which, e.g., a mayor would spend more only when she receives all
of the credit in her stand-alone election. While we cannot rule out that credit-claiming or free-rider
issues exist, we thank a careful referee by noting that any remaining credit-claiming issue means that we
estimate a lower bound of the effect stemming from hypothesis 4.
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the executive are strengthened significantly. That conclusion is summarised in hypothesis
4.
Hypothesis 4. In case of overlapping elections, observed budget cycles should gen-
erally be more pronounced. The effect should be further increased if
the executive seeks re-election to office.
4. Data
We use data from municipalities in BAY and BW from 1992 to 2006.28 We observe 2,056 mu-
nicipalities and a population of 12.5 million inhabitants in BAY and 10.5 million inhabitants
living in 1,101 municipalities in BW.
We obtained information on our outcome variable (total expenditures), state transfers, the
results of legislative elections, information on local population as well as population structure
from the respective state statistical offices. We calculate municipal expenditures net of
transfers, i.e., we subtract the amount of transfers from the respective state government from
gross expenditures. That step is crucial in order to capture and isolate the discretionary
amount of municipal spending and to eliminate confounding influences, such as spending
that is initiated by an upper level governmental tier, but only administered at the municipal
level. For instance, the latter could even be induced by PBCs in state level elections (see
Furdas et al., 2015).
We create dummy variables that identify a council’s pre-election, election, or post-election
year to capture the legislative PBC. Furthermore, we classify councils by the share of seats
held by leftwing parties (members of the Social Democratic Party, SPD, and the Green
Party, Grüne). We summarise all relevant descriptive information in Table 1. We explain
our variable coding further in Table A.2 in the appendix.
Obtaining comprehensive data on executive elections in BW is a challenging task. While
complete administrative data on elections is provided for BAY by the state statistical office,
such data do not exist for BW.29 Due to the lack of official data, we collected data manu-
ally by contacting and surveying all 1,101 municipalities with respect to the dates of past
executive elections. Using the responses obtained, we then searched regional newspapers
as well as official announcements (Staatsanzeiger Baden-Württemberg) to gather additional
28 The time coverage of this study is limited by the availability of data on municipal spending (Jahres-
rechnungsstatistik). Additionally, data for earlier executive elections in BW are hard to obtain, thus
preventing the coverage from being expanded. Data beyond 2006 cannot be used to estimate electoral
cycles because in 2007, municipalities in BAY changed accounting standards. This change was imple-
mented at endogenous points in time in each municipality, which opens up opportunities to manipulate
the observable budget strategically around election years.
29 We contacted all major authorities, including the state statistical office, the association of municipalities,
the state ministry of interior affairs and the state election office. No summary of official data exists for
mayoral elections in BW.
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information on specific elections, e.g., the name, age, party affiliation and regular occupa-
tion of the elected mayor as well as information on whether the incumbent mayor ran for
re-election. Finally, we conducted an intensive search of official websites and free internet
resources to fill other gaps in our data set.
Similar to legislative elections, we code a set of dummy variables for executive elections
indicating the pre-election, election, and post-election year in each municipality. Further-
more, we construct dummy variables for mayors indicating affiliation with one of the two
leftwing parties mentioned previously, whether the mayor serves in a full-time position, and
whether the incumbent mayor sought re-election in the current election.30 As the incentives
to manipulate public spending strategically should especially be stronger in case of the lat-
ter, we will construct respective interactions in order to capture the impact on the formation
of PBCs. Finally, we enter the mayor’s age as a further control variable in our regressions,
which also will be relevant against the background of our instrumental variables approach.
Compared to the total of 1,101 municipalities in BW and 16,515 municipal-year observa-
tions, we ultimately obtained adequate information on executive elections for 968 munici-
palities and significantly fewer years, namely a total of 10,531 municipal-year observations.
Typically small municipalities are lost due to missing information. That smaller sample is
explained by our research strategy, which was based on a questionnaire that smaller munici-
palities with fewer municipal staff might not be able to answer. However, we argue that our
results do not suffer from a bias given that the differences in the means of control variables
between the two groups are rather small (see Table A.3 in the appendix).
Mayoral terms may end prematurely because of the resignation or death of the incumbent
mayor. Because those events may potentially pose problems for the identification of electoral
cycles, we exclude non-completed or prematurely ended political terms from our baseline
specification. When testing the robustness of our main results, we also run estimations in
which we include all available observations, including incomplete terms.
30 About 60% of the mayors in the sample work full-time. To test the sensitivity of our results, we also
tested models in which we focus exclusively on full-time mayors. Those results return similar point
estimates, both in sign and magnitude. Because of the significantly smaller sample size, however, the
statistical significances of those estimates are not comparable to those reported in the main text (results






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We specify the following baseline model to identify political budget cycles in municipal
expenditures:
log(Yi,t) = t′li δ + t′ei φ + Ii,tθ +
1∑
k=−1







(tli,t+k × Ii,t)πk+2 +
1∑
k=−1
(tli,t+k × tei,t+k × Ii,t)σk+2 + X′i,tγ
+ λt + µi + h(t, s) + εi,t.
(1)
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total municipal expenditures, net of
transfers, Yi,t. The vectors t′l and t′e contain dummies capturing election dates in legislative
(l) and executive (e) branch elections, respectively. In particular, we define the following








=1 in the pre-election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the post-election year, 0 otherwise.
(2)
To test for differences in spending when election cycles overlap, we estimate interaction
terms for congruent pre-, post-, and election years as in Foremny and Riedel (2014). The
dummy variable Ii,t denotes whether the incumbent mayor seeks re-election at the next
election. The indicator is set to zero/one for the whole term, i.e., we assume that the mayor
already knows whether she will run for office again at the end of her term when she takes
office.31 As a result, the estimated coefficient on the incumbent indicator reveals spending
differences only between electoral periods. The estimation of interaction terms with the
mayoral election dummies then allows separating general from specific incumbent effects in
times of elections. Finally, the triple interactions capture the effects of overlapping electoral
cycles conditional on the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election.
We include general year (λt) and municipality (µi) fixed effects in the model as well
as allow for state-specific linear and quadratic time trends, which we denote by h(t, s).32
Additional control variables are denoted by X′i,t and include population, population squared
(to control for non-linear effects of local population sizes), demographic variables, state
election indicators, ideological proxies for both the executive and the legislative branch,
31 We assume that the mayor, at least, has some preferences about that decision, which leads to a final
decision at the end of her term. Note that without adopting that assumption, we would condition the
incumbent dummy on election years only, which would render separating general from specific incumbent
effects infeasible.
32 We also experimented with state-specific year effects, which eliminates the identification of the council
election effects. However, such a model can still identify mayoral and joint election effects and when we
do this the results remain reassuringly similar (results not reported).
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the age of the mayor and a dummy variable indicating whether the mayor is a full-time
politician.
It is important to highlight how our estimation specification identifies PBCs in legislative
and executive branch elections. Because legislative elections in BAY and BW are held in
different years, the effects of legislative cycles can be separated from general year effects
and from state-specific time trends. In contrast, the identification for the executive branch
elections is more demanding. As discussed in Section 2, executive elections in BAY generally
are held at the same time as legislative elections, with a few exceptions. In BW, however,
we observe executive elections across all years independently of legislative elections. That is
the source of variation, including overlapping as well as non-overlapping elections, that we
exploit in order to identify individual executive election cycles.
A further important condition for the identification of cycles is the exogeneity of election
dates. In case of legislative elections, terms are predetermined by state regulations and
cannot be influenced by individual municipalities. While for executive elections that also is
generally true, the municipality (and/or the mayor) may influence the timing of elections
within limits.33 In our baseline specification, we therefore decided to rely exclusively on
fully completed executive election terms. This ensures that election dates are exogenous and
predetermined exclusively by state regulation (eight years in BW and six years in BAY). In
the robustness section, we test the sensitivity of our results by including terms that ended
prematurely. The results remain unafected both in terms of size and significance.
Another issue that might be raised with respect to endogeneity is given by the incum-
bent’s decision to seek re-election. In particular, if that decision is linked directly to the
fiscal conditions of the municipality and the availability of sufficient financial means for
strategic spending, our estimates could not be interpreted as causal. For instance, if a fiscal
shock hits the municipality shortly before an election absorbing available financial means
initially intended for strategic spending and ultimately inducing the incumbent not to seek
re-election, we would falsely attribute pre-election variation in spending to executive cycles
in cases of incumbents not re-running for office.34 To deal with such potential endogeneity
formally, we follow an instrumental variables approach.
To that end, we use two different instruments (explained below) to account for the po-
tential endogeneity of the incumbency indicator. However, implementing an instrumen-
33 In particular, the term of the mayor may end prematurely if 1) the citizens or the council recall a mayor
(which is an extremely rare event); 2) the mayor dies or resigns owing to sickness (arguably exogenous
to our application); or 3) the mayor resigns for other reasons (personal or political reasons). It is clear
that a mayor will not return to office if his or her term ends prematurely because of resignation. One
potential reason for resignations in our data is given by mayors taking office in a larger city for greater
remuneration. While the decision to run for office in another municipality potentially is endogenous, the
timing is again exogenous because it is predetermined by the timing of elections in other towns.
34 Note that a potential incompetency of the incumbent would not cause such a pattern. This is the case
as incompetency would influence the municipal fiscal position negatively throughout the whole term and
is not necessarily confined to the years around an election.
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tal variables approach in the context of our estimation specification (see equation (1)) is
challenging because the incumbency variable enters both as individual and as interaction
variable. As such, first-stage regressions are necessary to instrument for the single vari-
able and its interaction terms. The procedure is shown in Equations (3.1) to (4) for the
interaction of the incumbent dummy and the executive election dummies. In a first step,
we separately regress the incumbent dummy (equation (3.1)) and its interactions with the
executive election dummies (equation (3.2)) on a set of instruments, i.e., the single instru-
ments Zi,t, their interactions with the executive election dummies (t′ei × Zi,t), and the full
set of the remaining covariates C′i,t. In a subsequent step, we use the predicted values for
the incumbent indicator and its interactions as regressors in the second stage regression
(equation (4), see Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 190ff) and Wooldridge (2010, p. 267f) for
more information).35
Ii,t = t′li α1 + t′ei α2 + Zi,tα3 + (t′ei × Zi,t)α4 + C′i,tα5 + ξi,t (3.1)
(t′ei × Ii,t) ≡ TIi = t′li κ1 + t′ei κ2 + Zi,tκ3 + (t′ei × Zi,t)κ4 + C′i,tκ5 + ςi,t (3.2)
log(Yi,t) = t′li δ + t′ei φ + Îiθ + T̂Iiπ + X′i,tγ + λt + µi + h(t, s) + εi,t (4)
Fortunately, the institutional design allows us to construct a set of instruments to obtain
consistent estimates, as they are uncorrelated with the error term of equation (1), but highly
correlated with the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election. We use the following variables
and their interactions with the election dummies to instrument the incumbent indicator, all
of which we derived from a careful exploitation of the features of the municipal electoral
law.36
First, we create a dummy variable that is set to one if the mayor is eligible to receive a
pension (dummy mayor is pensionable). In both states, in general, the mayor is eligible to
receive a pension only if she has served as a temporary civil servant for a particular number
of years and has completed at least one entire term of elective office.37
35 One might falsely consider estimating the first stage regression exclusively for the single instrument and
the incumbent dummy and then compute the interaction term for the second stage regression manually
by using the predicted values of the incumbency indicator. That procedure, however, will produce
inconsistent estimates. The results of the first stage regression for the incumbent dummy are presented
in Table A.6 in the appendix. The results of the remaining first stage regressions for the interaction
terms are available upon request. In equations 3.1 and 3.2, municipalty and time fixed effects as well as
the state-specific time trends are summarised by C′i,t ≡ X′i,t + λt + µi + h(t, s).
36 Again, as for the incumbent seeks re-election dummy, both indicators are equal to zero/one for the full
term of office.
37 In BAY, the mayor is eligible to receive a pension if she has served as a mayor for two complete terms and
was not re-elected at the next election or refused to accept election. In BW, the rule is more complex:
The mayor is eligible to receive a pension if she has completed one full term and fulfills one of three
criteria: a) she has served as a temporary civil servant (including positions in the public sector, but not
necessarily as a mayor) for 18 years and is older than 47 years of age in the election year; b) has served
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Second, we create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the mayor is older than 60 in
the year of the executive election (dummy mayor is older than 60 years). That age thresh-
old is motivated both by the age distribution of incumbent mayors not seeking re-election
(see Figure 2) and the general average age of retirement in the western German population.
Concerning the latter, the average pensionable age of men in the western states of Germany
(including BAY and BW) in the 1990–2006 period was 60.31 years (German Federal Pension
Fund, 2014).38 The threshold is confirmed by our data, incumbent mayors are significantly
less likely to seek re-election if they are older than 60 years of age (see left panel of Figure
2) and while no official age threshold has been established, retirements start to rise at 60
years (see right panel of Figure 2). Checking the sensitivity of our results, we find that they
are robust to changes in the precise definition of the age threshold.
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Age of the incumbent mayor in the election
year if the mayor does not re-run for office
The two instruments we construct fulfill both necessary conditions for an instrumental
variables regression: they are relevant in terms of explaining the incumbent’s decision to
run for re-election (mayors above the age of 60 years and mayors who are eligible to receive
pensions have weaker incentives to seek re-election), but are exogenous to local expendi-
tures. In case of the latter, no direct link exists between pension eligibility and public
spending. With respect to the mayor’s age, in contrast, one might argue that older mayors
have different preferences shaping their spending behavior. However, we account for that
possibility by controlling explicitly for the mayor’s age in the regressions.39 Also, tests for
overidentification support the appropriateness of our instruments.
as a mayor for two complete terms (= 16 years); or c) has served as a mayor for eight years and is older
than 60 years of age in the election year. For further details see Article 21 KWBG (Law on local elections
and public servants) (BAY) and §36ff LBG (Law on state public servants) (BW).
38 We refer to men only because the vast majority of mayors are men. The figure increases only slightly if
women are taken into account.
39 Note that age is insignificant throughout all specifications (see Table A.5 in the appendix).
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6. Results
Table 2 presents the main results of our estimations using the above described instrumental
variable approach. The results of the fixed effects OLS regression are reported in Table
A.4 in the appendix for comparison purposes.40 Stepwise, the table develops our full model
(column 6). In columns (1) and (2), we specify simple PBC models in which we study
legislative and executive election effects separately. While column (1) shows the results for
the legislative elections, effects of the executive elections are modeled in column (2). In
column (3), we incorporate both cycles into one model. In column (4), we also estimate the
interactions between joint legislative and executive election years and explore the effects of
overlapping cycles. In column (5), we interact the incumbent dummy with the executive
election dummies. Finally, we present the estimation results for the full model in column (6).
There, we estimate the effects of overlapping PBCs conditional on the incumbent mayor’s
decision to run for reelection.
Cycles in the legislative and executive branches
For legislative elections, we find sizable and statistically significant effects (at the 5 percent
level) for the pre-election year across all specifications that are robust to the inclusion of
the executive cycle as well as the various interaction effects. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of municipal total expenditures (net of transfers); therefore, the coefficients
must be interpreted as semi-elasticities. The estimated effects in Table 2 range between
1.4–1.6 percent of total expenditures in the first five columns and are somewhat larger with
4.4 percent in column (6). For a town with 5,000 inhabitants, an effect size of 1.5 percent
amounts to about 170,000 Euro in additional expenditures in the year prior to a legislative
election.
For executive elections, we do not find evidence of a robust individual cycle in total
expenditures. While we do find evidence for unconditional post-election year cycles in
executive elections (columns (2) and (3)), that effect disappears once further interaction
effects are included. Remaining point estimates of the election dummies in case of executive
elections are quite small and statistically insignificant.
With regard to our hypotheses, we can summarise that there is some indication (although
not significantly so in all cases) that both levels of government seem to produce some cycles
(1) and that the legislative cycles is indeed more pronounced (and more stable) than the
executive cycle (2). We now turn the analysis to the effects of incumbency as well as overlaps.
40 In both tables we report the results for our main variables of interest only (legislative and executive
election dummies, the incumbent runs again dummy as well as the various interaction effects). The
results for the control variables are presented in the appendix (see Table A.5). Interestingly, statistically
significant effects are not found for the mayor’s age, the full-time mayor dummy, or either ideology
proxies. While increasing population has a concave effect on local expenditures, the shares of young and
old people do not affect spending.
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Table 2: PBCs in public expenditure (instrumental variables regression)
Dependent variable: total expenditures in logs (net of transfers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legislative elections
Pre-election year 0.016∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.044∗∗
[2.477] [2.194] [2.266] [2.293] [2.103]
Election year 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.012
[0.282] [-0.140] [0.138] [-0.125] [0.639]
Post-election year 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003
[0.918] [-0.145] [-0.655] [-0.002] [-0.216]
Executive elections
Pre-election year 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.017 0.000
[0.786] [0.066] [0.401] [-1.459] [0.017]
Election year 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.036∗
[1.126] [1.129] [0.978] [0.181] [1.726]
Post-election year 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.007 0.033 -0.003
[2.641] [2.475] [1.310] [1.330] [-0.138]
Executive elections × legislative elections
Joint pre-election year -0.005 -0.049∗
[-0.568] [-1.650]
Joint election year -0.004 -0.046∗
[-0.375] [-1.854]
Joint post-election year 0.008 0.068∗∗
[0.855] [2.480]
Executive elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election year 0.020 0.001
[1.511] [0.065]
Election year 0.002 -0.041
[0.084] [-1.599]
Post-election year -0.033 0.013
[-1.036] [0.491]














Incumbent runs again dummy 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.017
[1.489] [1.635] [1.617] [1.613] [0.791] [1.111]
Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 39344 39344 39344 39344 39344 39344
R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.075
Cluster 2997 2997 2997 2997 2997 2997
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM) 888.7 865.4 864.3 863.4 833.2 674.8
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 1066.3 1024.9 1023.0 1021.0 150.4 49.2
Overidentification test (Hansen J p-value) 0.824 0.851 0.850 0.848 0.977 0.755
AIC -13092.4 -13090.4 -13089.4 -13084.3 -13054.8 -12983.9
SBIC -12826.4 -12824.4 -12797.7 -12766.8 -12736.3 -12589.2
Notes: The instrumented variable is the incumbent runs again dummy. Instruments are a dummy indicating whether the mayor is
pensionable, a dummy indicating whether the mayor is older than 60 years, and the interactions of the instruments with the elec-
tion indicators (if used in the regression, see the results of the first stage regression in Table A.6 in the appendix). All specifications
include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***, (**), (*) denotes significance at the 1-,
(5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered at the municipal level. Interaction effects for election dummies are estimated only for
congruent election years. Marginal effects of the interaction effects in columns (5) and (6) are shown in Table 3. The estimation
includes the full set of additional control variables. Source: Own calculations.
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Incumbents seeking re-election
In the instrumental variable approach, the dummy whether the incumbent seeks re-election
(see bottom of table 2) is sizable and positive but remains statistically insignificant (the
estimates are statistically significant and positive in the OLS fixed effects specification, see
Table A.4 in the appendix). While those results indicate more spending in election periods
when the incumbent seeks re-election (especially in the OLS regression), we cannot confirm
hypothesis 3 fully based on this evidence.
Overlapping cycles
While columns (1), (2) and (3) report the results for separate cycles in the two branches
of government, the case of overlapping cycles is first highlighted in column (4). There, we
include dummies for cases when the two elections are held exactly the same year in a mu-
nicipality. The results are not fully transparent from the table. The point estimates do
not signify any cycles. However, what is important for interpretation are not the individual
effects per se, but the combined effects of variables that are turned on for a specific case.
Against that background, municipal spending seems to increase in the year following simulta-
neous elections to both political branches. The combined executive post-election coefficients
is 0.015** (p-value = 0.035, instrumental variables regression). That result points to po-
tential post-election collusion between the two political branches in order to gain electoral
advantage (see hypothesis 4).
However, the underlying channel remains unclear in these estimations, which leads us to
extend the model further. In columns (5) and (6) of table 2, we augment the model with
interactions of a dummy indicating whether or not the incumbent mayor seeks re-election
and the cycle variables.41
Overlapping cycles and interactions with incumbency effects
In column (5), we include interactions between incumbent mayors choosing to run for of-
fice again and mayoral election dummies, while column (6) reports the results for the full
model in which interactions between the incumbency and the election year dummies in both
political branches are included. As this is a very complex setting involving multiple interac-
tions such that coefficients can hardly be interpreted in isolation, we refer to Table 3, which
presents F-tests of joint significance for the (combination of) estimated effects and therefore
is complementary to the present results. We report the F-tests for the OLS model (columns
(1) and (2)) to make full comparison possible, however; we will discuss and highlight only
the results pertaining to the IV approach (columns (3) and (4)).
41 The same is done for the OLS estimates in table A.4.
18
The structure of Table 3 is as follows: while distinguishing between pre-election, election,
and post-election years, we compute marginal effects for overlapping legislative and executive
elections conditional on whether the incumbent mayor runs for re-election. We then test
whether the difference between those effects is statistically different from zero. Additionally,
we compute the marginal incumbent effect conditional on whether a simultaneous election is
held. That effect can then be contrasted to the unconditional effect (incumbent runs again
dummy) shown in the two baseline tables.
Most importantly, we want to refer the reader to line E in Table 3. There, we document
a sizable and statistically significant incumbent effect in the range of 3.2–3.8 percent con-
ditional on joint legislative and executive elections the following year. Note that this effect
is much larger than the unconditional point estimates presented in Table 2, thus providing
clearer evidence in support of hypothesis 3.
The results for executive and legislative elections, conditional on joint election years and
the incumbent seeks re-election dummy, are further summarised in Figure 3.42 For both
branches, we observe a similar pattern for joint pre-election, election, and post-election years
conditional on the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election. That is, if the incumbent seeks
re-election, spending increases in joint pre-election and joint election years but decreases in
joint post-election years. Exactly the opposite holds true if the incumbent does not seek
re-election: spending decreases in joint pre-election and joint election years but increases in
the year after both elections took place. As a result, we detect sizable positive differences in
joint pre-election and joint election years, with meaningful negative differences in joint post-
election years. While the individual effects and differences are significant at the 5 percent
level for the joint-pre-election year in the executive and for the joint election year in the
legislative, the results for the post-election year in the executive branch remain marginally
insignificant.
Taken together, municipal expenditures increase in joint pre-election and election years
if the incumbent seeks re-election and increase in joint post-election years if she did not.
In case of the first two results, one might argue that these are expected as incentives for
strategic spending and collusion with the municipal council are highest if the incumbent
seeks re-election (hypothesis 4). Furthermore, we observe the pattern that in these settings,
with mayors who are not seeking re-election, spending usually decreases. This effect may be
justified with shifts in the budget over time rather than deficit spending. As the incentives
for strategic spending are highest preceding and contemporary to elections, an incumbent
may shift future expenditure to the present causing a decline in post-election expenditure
if the mayor seeks re-election. The observation of a positive and statistically significant
effect for the legislative as well as executive branch in post-election years conditional on the
incumbent not running for office (see also lines K and M in Table 3) may be explained by
42 The underlying marginal effects and levels of statistical significance all refer to column (4) in Table 3.
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Table 3: Marginal effects of interaction terms: Fixed effects OLS regression vs.
instrumental variables regression
Fixed effects OLS Instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-election year
A: Legislative | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.006 -0.005
[-0.392] [-0.236]
B: Legislative | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.015 0.015
[1.577] [1.382]
Difference if incumbent reruns (B-A) 0.021 0.020
[1.483] [0.799]
C: Executive | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.018*** -0.026** -0.017 -0.049**
[-2.590] [-2.126] [-1.459] [-2.138]
D: Executive | joint pre-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.006
[1.422] [0.584] [0.788] [0.714]
Difference if incumbent reruns (D-C) 0.024*** 0.031** 0.020 0.055**
[3.209] [2.437] [1.511] [2.069]
E: Incumbent runs again | joint pre-election years 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.032* 0.039**
[3.325] [3.288] [1.834] [2.009]
Election year
F: Legislative | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.025* -0.034*
[-1.902] [-1.858]
G: Legislative | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.005 0.010
[0.480] [0.928]
Difference if incumbent reruns (G-F) 0.030** 0.044**
[2.069] [1.983]
H: Executive | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.007 -0.013 0.003 -0.010
[-0.865] [-0.980] [0.181] [-0.408]
I: Executive | joint election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.010** 0.007 0.005 0.006
[2.141] [0.966] [0.881] [0.733]
Difference if incumbent reruns (H-I) 0.017* 0.020 0.002 0.016
[1.763] [1.439] [0.084] [0.576]
J: Incumbent runs again | joint election years 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.014 0.021
[2.795] [3.139] [1.044] [1.355]
Post-election year
K: Legislative | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 0.005 0.065**
[0.389] [2.369]
L: Legislative | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.004 -0.016
[0.407] [-1.275]
Difference if incumbent reruns (L-K) -0.002 -0.081**
[-0.118] [-2.240]
M: Executive | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 0 -0.005 0.003 0.033 0.065*
[-0.626] [0.249] [1.330] [1.953]
N: Executive | joint post-election years, incumbent runs again = 1 0.014*** 0.017** 0.000 -0.002
[3.098] [2.281] [0.011] [-0.175]
Difference if incumbent reruns (N-M) 0.019* 0.014 -0.033 -0.067
[1.940] [1.046] [-1.036] [-1.595]
O: Incumbent runs again | joint post-election years 0.023*** 0.023** -0.021 -0.051
[3.090] [2.446] [-1.007] [-1.560]
Notes: The marginal effects are computed by using the coefficients of columns (5) and (6) of Table A.4 and Table 2, respec-
tively. Statistical significance is based on F-tests. t-values are shown in brackets. Marginal effects are computed for overlapping
legislative and executive elections conditional on whether the incumbent mayor runs for re-election while distinguishing between
pre-election, election, and post-election years. Afterwards, it is tested whether the difference between these effects is statisti-
cally different from zero. ***, (**), (*) denotes significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Source: Own calculations based on
Stata command lincom.
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Figure 3: Marginal effects of executive and legislative elections conditional on joint
elections and the incumbent’s decision to re-run for office
Difference Difference Difference
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Difference Difference Difference
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Legislative election
Incumbent reruns Incumbent reruns Incumbent reran
Executive election
Joint pre-election year Joint election year Joint post-election year
Incumbent reruns Incumbent reruns Incumbent reran



















Notes: The figure presents marginal effects of executive (top graph) and legislative (bottom graph) elections
conditional on overlapping pre-, post-, and election years and the incumbent runs again dummy. The black
bars indicate the difference in spending conditional on the incumbent’s decision to re-run for office. Figures
at the top/bottom of each bar denote marginal effects which refer to column (4) of Table 3. ***, (**), (*)
display significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level.
the new mayor in office colluding with the municipal council to initiate investment projects
promised throughout her electoral campaign.
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7. Robustness checks
We carry out various sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our findings. All tests are
carried out for columns (5) and (6) of Table 2. The results are reported in Table 4 (general
tests) and Table 5 (specifications with alternative instruments). The letters in italics at
the end of the lines correspond to those in Table 3. Only the main results of the previous
findings are presented, i.e., we show the unconditional coefficient for legislative pre-election
years, the incumbent effect conditional on joint pre-election years, and the difference in
spending if the incumbent seeks re-election conditional on joint pre-election, election, and
post-election years. All of the estimates include the full set of covariates.
With respect to general tests (Table 4), we first include non-complete mayoral terms pe-
riods in the estimation. These periods were excluded from the previous regressions because
the timing of executive elections could be endogenous. Second, we exclude county-free cities
from the estimation sample.43 PBCs in these cities might differ from the full sample because
their elections are more partisan than those held in smaller municipalities. Third, to check
whether the results are affected by the clustering of the error terms, we alternatively cluster
at the county level. Fourth, we re-estimate all specifications for data on gross expenditures,
i.e., we add state transfers to municipal expenditures. That may provide further insights
into the formation of PBCs, as municipal spending may be co-financed by upper-level gov-
ernmental tiers. Finally, we take account of the state of the municipal economy by entering
the share of employees in the working population as an additional control.44 In an additional
robustness tests (results not reported), we also implemented a dynamic LSDV specification
and found qualitatively similar results even there.45
Concerning specifications with alternative instruments (Table 5), we first apply different
thresholds of the age dummy. The instrument indicating that the mayor is older than
60 years in the executive election year is replaced by a threshold of 59 years (columns
(1) and (2)) and a threshold of 61 years (columns (3) and (4)), respectively. Second, we
replace the binary age instrument with a discrete measure and enter the mayor’s actual
age as an instrument. However, that substitution comes at the expense of controlling for
43 The federal states in Germany are further subdivided into administrative counties. These counties usually
subsume several cities. In case of several large cities, however, these form a county on there own and are
referred to as county-free cities. BW has 9 county-free cities and BAY has 25 county-free cities.
44 Information on the municipal unemployment rate from the Federal Employment Agency is available only
from 1998 onwards.
45 The literature on PBCs has often employed dynamic specifications (solving the estimation issues in GMM
methods) because of the persistent nature of expenditures. In the present application, the estimation is
complicated further by the fact that we must instrument the incumbent mayor’s decision to stand for
reelection. We would thus have to solve the dual problem of instrumenting both the lagged endogenous
variables and the reelection variable. That is not possible using standard methods for dynamic estima-
tions. For robustness, we opted for the simpler LSDV approach. However, we decided that those results
are not very informative as - given our data structure - the resulting Nickel bias cannot be argued to be
small. All such estimates are available upon request.
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the direct impact of the mayor’s age on public spending. While we do not detect such
an impact in the previous regressions (see, e.g., Table A.5), the instrument’s exogeneity
assumption is weaker than when using the non-linear transformation of the mayor’s age
along with controlling for a direct effect at the same time. Finally, we estimate our model
using a single instrument rather than two as in the previous regressions and rely on the
dummy variable indicating whether the mayor is older than 60 in the year of the executive
election. This is due to the Bavarian state regulation associated with pension eligibility,
i.e., there might be a confounding effect as one condition to become pensionable in BAY
is that the incumbent sought re-election (but was not elected or refused to accept her
election). Accordingly, an incumbent could strategically decide to seek re-election in order
to become pensionable, even though it is not her intention to take office afterwards. However,
estimating the instrumental variables regression with only one instrument means that we
can no longer test for overidentification.
The results reveal that the findings are highly robust. Both the economic and statistical
significance of the unconditional legislative pre-election year effect are confirmed. Further-
more, only minor changes arise with respect to the difference in joint pre-election, election,
and post-election years, conditional on whether the incumbent runs for re-election. While
the point estimates only change slightly, the statistical significance is lost in legislative elec-
tion years when we include non-completed election periods or apply a threshold of 59 years
for the age instrument (column (2), line G-F in Tables 4 and 5) and in legislative post-
election years when we run regressions with only one instrument (column (4), line L-K in
Table 5). Furthermore, we lose statistical significance for the conditional incumbent effect
when using the mayor’s age as an instrument (columns (5) and (6), line E in Table 5).
Overall, our robustness analyses show that the main findings of our study hold up. A
reversal in the effect materialises for pre-election and election years compared to post-election
years conditional on the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election. Expenditures are higher
in the year before the election and in the election year if the incumbent runs for re-election
and cycles overlap, and increase in post-election years if the incumbent mayor did not run






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We study PBCs in expenditures with a particular focus on overlapping election cycles in the
executive and legislative branches of local governments. As the literature on PBCs usually
cannot separate effects for those two political branches, doing so is a distinct feature of
our study. Furthermore, we use an instrumental variable approach to account explicitly for
the potential endogeneity of the incumbent mayor’s decision to seek re-election and how
that decision affects spending at times of elections. Using data from Bavaria and Baden-
Wuerttemberg allows for consistent estimations of the spending cycles in an institutionally
fixed framework.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: 1) We find sizable and statistically
significant unconditional pre-election effects for legislative elections that are significant at
the 5 percent level. Total expenditures are increased between 1.3–1.8 percent in the year
before the legislative election takes place. 2) The budget cycle effects for the legislative
branch are robust to the inclusion of election variables for the executive branch. 3) We find,
on average, no unconditional (pre-)election PBC for executive branch elections. 4) The
findings also hold for the interaction effects when we condition on whether the incumbent
mayor runs for re-election. However, if we look at differences for the incumbent effect at times
of elections, 5) we highlight increased spending in pre-election years if the incumbent seeks
re-election at the 5 percent level. Finally, 6) we find insightful differences for overlapping
cycles conditional on the incumbent’s decision to seek re-election. Municipal expenditures
increase in joint pre-election and election years if the mayor runs for re-election and decline
in joint post-election years if she did not. Those effects are statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
Our results support the following conclusions: First, joint legislative and executive branch
elections seem to matter for the formation of PBCs. Separating local elections thus can re-
duce politically motivated distortions in expenditures before elections. Second, our findings
for increased spending before executive elections when the incumbent mayor seeks re-election
may justify age and term limits. In BAY and BW, we have (in)direct age limits but no term
limit restrictions. Abolishing the age limits likely would add to the number of incumbent
candidates seeking re-election, while introducing term limits would work in the opposite
direction. Nonetheless, we would refrain from drawing explicit inferences from our results.
On the one hand, strong age and term limit rules could be viewed as restraining overspend-
ing before joint executive and legislative branch elections. However, the chief executive’s
incentive to manipulate the one election in which she could be re-elected (if we assume a
two-term limit) could even become stronger (see, for instance, Klein and Sakurai, 2015, in
the context of subnational elections in Brazil). Thus, it is not obvious whether the intro-
duction of term limits would weaken or strengthen the overall effect of strategic budgetary
26
manipulation in the long run and is, therefore, a question open for further research.
27
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Table A.3: Sample selection comparison for BW
Full Sample Estimation Sample
No/Mean S.D. No/Mean S.D.
Number of municipalities 1101 - 968 -
Municipal-year observations 16515 - 10531 -
Log total exp. (net of transfers) 15.964 1.182 16.116 1.143
Population (per thousands) 9.481 25.54 10.800 28.19
Population share < 15 0.182 0.024 0.180 0.024
Population share > 65 0.151 0.029 0.155 0.029
37
Table A.4: PBCs in public expenditure (fixed effects OLS regression)
Dependent variable: total expenditures in logs (net of transfers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legislative elections
Pre-election year 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.018∗
[2.398] [2.090] [2.141] [2.246] [1.691]
Election year 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
[0.257] [-0.296] [0.037] [-0.251] [-0.268]
Post-election year 0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.007
[0.996] [0.011] [-0.547] [0.088] [-0.672]
Executive elections
Pre-election year 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.003
[0.876] [0.193] [0.462] [-2.590] [-0.310]
Election year 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.007 0.009
[1.442] [1.511] [1.310] [-0.865] [0.804]
Post-election year 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.006 -0.005 -0.009
[2.612] [2.420] [1.251] [-0.626] [-0.775]
Executive elections × legislative elections
Joint pre-election year -0.005 -0.023
[-0.518] [-1.344]
Joint election year -0.004 -0.022
[-0.452] [-1.370]
Joint post-election year 0.008 0.012
[0.865] [0.775]
Executive elections × incumbent runs again
Pre-election year 0.024∗∗∗ 0.007
[3.209] [0.627]
Election year 0.017∗ -0.005
[1.763] [-0.344]
Post-election year 0.019∗ 0.020
[1.940] [1.505]














Incumbent runs again dummy 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004
[2.940] [3.053] [3.050] [3.043] [0.718] [0.631]
Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554
R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Cluster 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017
AIC -13148.6 -13148.7 -13147.1 -13142 -13156.2 -13144.6
SBIC -12882.5 -12882.5 -12855.2 -12824.4 -12838.5 -12749.7
Notes: All specifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***, (**), (*)
denotes significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered at the municipal level. Interaction effects for
election dummies are estimated only for congruent election years. Marginal effects of the interaction effects in columns (5)
and (6) are shown in Table 3. The estimation also includes a number of additional control variables, see full list in Table
A.5 in the appendix. Source: Own calculations.
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Table A.5: PBCs in public expenditure: Control variables for Table A.4
Dependent variable: total expenditures in logs (net of transfers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share left parties in council 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
[0.571] [0.580] [0.554] [0.554] [0.555] [0.552]
Dummy left mayor -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
[-0.774] [-0.771] [-0.766] [-0.765] [-0.762] [-0.754]
Dummy full time mayor 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.815] [0.797] [0.807] [0.805] [0.809] [0.800]
Age of the mayor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.700] [0.863] [0.836] [0.840] [0.133] [0.140]
State elections
Pre-election year -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000
[-0.527] [-1.066] [-0.284] [0.091] [-0.341] [0.048]
Election year 0.011∗∗ 0.003 0.010∗ 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.010∗
[2.088] [1.075] [1.799] [1.746] [1.856] [1.854]
Post-election year 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
[4.028] [7.054] [4.025] [4.324] [3.952] [4.307]
Population 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
[3.377] [3.418] [3.402] [3.409] [3.404] [3.407]
Population squared -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
[-2.993] [-3.037] [-3.029] [-3.037] [-3.014] [-3.029]
Share population < 15 years 0.288 0.293 0.288 0.288 0.290 0.292
[1.156] [1.177] [1.155] [1.158] [1.164] [1.171]
Share population > 65 years 0.131 0.181 0.142 0.151 0.151 0.160
[0.737] [1.096] [0.792] [0.831] [0.842] [0.878]
Trend BAY 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
[14.338] [9.572] [14.364] [14.358] [14.421] [14.407]
Trend BAY squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
[-5.980] [-2.977] [-6.018] [-6.015] [-6.079] [-6.077]
Trend BW 0.036∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
[13.353] [9.853] [13.396] [13.344] [13.352] [13.345]
Trend BW squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
[-5.836] [-1.762] [-5.912] [-5.888] [-5.923] [-5.923]
Constant 15.153∗∗∗ 15.141∗∗∗ 15.147∗∗∗ 15.146∗∗∗ 15.165∗∗∗ 15.163∗∗∗
[226.984] [229.019] [225.610] [224.519] [219.643] [218.392]
Observations 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554 39554
R2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Cluster 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017 3017
Notes: All specifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***,
(**), (*) denotes significance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered at the municipal level.
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Table A.6: PBCs in public expenditure: First stage regression of Table 2
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if the incumbent runs for re-election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument 1: Dummy mayor is pensionable -0.196∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
[-15.249] [-15.016] [-14.993] [-14.976] [-17.160] [-17.086]
Instrument 2: Dummy mayor is older than 60 years -0.358∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗
[-26.568] [-26.258] [-26.243] [-26.240] [-25.577] [-22.991]
Legislative elections
Pre-election year 0.011 0.021∗∗ 0.001 0.029∗∗∗ -0.014
[1.113] [2.064] [0.114] [3.319] [-0.963]
Election year 0.001 0.034∗∗∗ -0.006 0.043∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗
[0.103] [3.851] [-0.509] [5.554] [-2.121]
Post-election year 0.015∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.001 0.064∗∗∗ -0.004
[2.030] [4.189] [-0.122] [6.973] [-0.429]
Executive elections
Pre-election year 0.006 -0.000 -0.011 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[1.213] [-0.076] [-1.626] [-3.821] [-5.839]
Election year -0.054∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
[-8.369] [-8.696] [-9.124] [-9.824] [-10.386]
Post-election year -0.042∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗
[-4.617] [-5.129] [-5.916] [-32.439] [-25.287]
Executive elections × legislative elections
Joint pre-election year 0.031∗ 0.067∗∗∗
[1.788] [3.136]
Joint election year 0.092∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
[4.825] [7.017]
Joint post-election year 0.101∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
[4.378] [10.770]
Executive elections × instrument 1
Pre-election year 0.022∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
[2.917] [6.168]
Election year 0.039∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
[3.603] [7.258]
Post-election year 0.480∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
[26.536] [25.584]
Executive elections × instrument 2
Pre-election year 0.016∗ -0.076∗∗∗
[1.912] [-3.157]
Election year -0.020 -0.216∗∗∗
[-1.544] [-7.094]
Post-election year 0.465∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
[23.333] [15.409]




























Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 39363 39363 39363 39363 39363 39363
R2 0.220 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.335 0.343
Notes: All specifications include municipality and time fixed effects. Robust t-values are shown in brackets. ***, (**), (*) denotes sig-
nificance at the 1-, (5-), (10-)%-level. Error terms are clustered at the municipal level. The estimation includes the full set of additional
control variables. Source: Own calculations.
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